Privacy
Last month, Zoom’s privacy policy contained this excerpt. Bold emphasis mine:
"Does Zoom sell Personal Data?
Depends what you mean by "sell."
We do not allow marketing companies, or anyone else to access Personal Data in exchange for payment. Except as described above, we do not allow any third parties to access any Personal Data we collect in the course of providing services to users. We do not allow third parties to use any Personal Data obtained from us for their own purposes, unless it is with your consent (e.g. when you download an app from the Marketplace. So in our humble opinion, we don't think most of our users would see us as selling their information, as that practice is commonly understood."
This appears carefully written by lawyers to permit them to do pretty much whatever they want with your information, while pretending otherwise, and it’s a really good thing they changed it. Zoom put out a significant revision their privacy policy on March 29 th
which clarified the difference between Zoom services (things you use to conference with other people) and its website, zoom.us. As it stands now, your Zoom services and your personal information are clearly walled off from use for advertising and trackers. However, they specifically exempt their own zoom.us site and so conceivably Zoom itself can use your data for their own marketing purposes.
Vulnerabilities
Zoom's security is somewhat dubious. Motherboard wrote in late March that Zoom's iPhone app was sending user data to Facebook, even if the user didn't have a Facebook account. Zoom killed that off, but their response leaves me worried about sloppy software development with unintended consequences:
"We originally implemented the 'Login with Facebook' feature using the Facebook SDK in order to provide our users with another convenient way to access our platform. However, we were recently made aware that the Facebook SDK was collecting unnecessary device data," Zoom told Motherboard in a statement on March 20.
Last year, a researcher discovered a problem
with the Zoom software for Mac which allowed any malicious website to enable the camera without permission. What this means is that Zoom designed its service to bypass browser security
settings and remotely enable a user's web camera without the user's knowledge or consent. Zoom has since patched this vulnerability.
1. A default setting in Windows automatically sends your credentials (username and password hash) when you click on a UNC link of the format \\server_name\share_name.
2. Zoom made clickable links out of text determined to be a UNC path but it’s hardly the only application that does this – common applications in Microsoft Office like Outlook, Word, and Excel have the same behavior. Zoom removed this behavior in a software update. This is a case of “old problem, new route of trying to get people to click malicious links”.
There are configuration settings you can change within Windows to prevent this undesirable spewing of your credentials even if you click on a link; contact us
if you’d like more information.
On April 2 nd
, it was reported that Zoom showed users information from other participants’ LinkedIn profiles, with no indication to the latter party. Like above, Zoom has fixed this.
Encryption
In Zoom's white paper, there is a list of "pre-meeting security capabilities" that are available to the meeting host that starts with "Enable an end-to-end (E2E) encrypted meeting." Later in the white paper, it lists "Secure a meeting with E2E encryption" as an "in-meeting security capability" that's available to meeting hosts. When a host starts a meeting with the "Require Encryption for 3rd Party Endpoints" setting enabled, participants see a green padlock that says, "Zoom is using an end to end encrypted connection" when they mouse over it.
When pressed, Zoom admitted: "Currently, it is not possible to enable E2E encryption for Zoom video meetings”. As of this writing, the whitepaper still exists on Zoom’s site, but has been updated to remove any mention of end to end encryption.
The problem isn’t so much that Zoom is using transport encryption over the public Internet – after all, this is the same technology used between your browser and your secure websites like online banking. When it’s properly implemented, TLS is reasonably good at its job of protecting your data from digital eavesdropping as it goes across the public Internet.
A Citizen Lab pointed out, that very same security guide whitepaper claims that the Zoom app uses AES-256 encryption for meetings where possible. They discovered, though, that in reality, each Zoom meeting only uses a single AES-128 key (in ECB mode) shared by all meeting participants for crypto of the audio and video data. to encrypt and decrypt audio and video.
The use of electronic codebook (ECB) mode for AES-128 is disturbing. Without descent too far into the cryptography rabbit hole, ECB is the simplest block cipher mode applicable to AES-128, with the primary disadvantage is how it handles patterns in data, such as identical blocks of text or uniform areas of color.
Here’s an example: